Germany might do when she recovered her strength, should urge us to guarantee the western frontier of Poland as we guaranteed the eastern frontiers of France and Belgium. It was equally natural that we should decline. Poland was farther away, and she meant far less to the man in the street—the ultimate arbiter of British policy—than France and Belgium, Secondly Germany seemed resigned to her losses in the west but not in the east. It is true that she signed arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia and pledged herself not to attempt to change the Polish frontier by force; but there was no renunciation of claims in the treaty, and no thought of it in German hearts. Thirdly our armaments were too small to cover extended liabilities. Our policy may be summarized in a sentence : we underwrote an accepted frontier, and, refused to uphold one which was not agreed. Even With this important limitation the stabilising influence of the treaty was generally recognized. It was widely believed that the hatchet wns buried at last. Painlev6, the eminent French statesman, once declared that the reconciliation of France and Germany was the corner-stone of European civilization, He was right, and it seemed as if the miracle had been achieved- Our apprehensions had -been removed by the surrender of the German fleet. French anxieties were relieved by the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine, though BriancTs enthusiasm was hever shared by the majority of his countrymen. What was left to trouble the peace of Western Europe when Great Britain, France and Germany marched in step ?

It was a fair, prospect, all the more reassuring since the treaty was only to become operative when Germany entered the League. This she desired "to do, and France was at last

willing to welcome her approach. She would have come in when the League was founded, as large sections of British and American opinion desired, had she been allowed; but French sentiment had been too embittered. In the closing months of his rule Mr. Lloyd George privately tried to open the door, but the French replied that it was premature. During the occupation of the Ruhr no German would have dreamed of joining a body krgely dominated by France. Now, after the fall of Poincare, after the withdrawal from the Ruhr, after the acceptance of the Dawes plan, it was possible to enter without loss of dignity.

• Before the outward process of reconciliation was completed a deplorable hitch occurred; Germany, it was well understood,